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A CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT WORKS FOR WORKING 
PEOPLE 
John Vail∗ 
Serial wrongdoers have treated jury trials the same way dogs treat fire 
hydrants. Over the last thirty years, they have led a campaign, sometimes public, 
more often quiet and stealthy, to make it progressively harder for working people 
to get, or to mete out, justice. Too few people have noticed. 
Serial wrongdoers—generally, large corporations—have sought to make it 
more difficult to get into court and, if you get in, to make it more difficult to get 
cases before juries, the one decision-making institution they have not been able 
to buy. Their efforts have worked. Lay people decide cases increasingly less 
often. Power has been transferred from citizens to elites. 
An administration that cares more about working people than about elites 
can wrest power from the uppity class, return it to jurors, and reopen the courts 
to real people. 
Abundant academic literature chronicles the phenomena I describe here.1 I 
want to focus, in plain terms, on certain mechanisms by which access to courts, 
 
 ∗ Mr. John Vail is the founder of the John Vail Law PLLC. Before founding his own law firm, Mr. Vail 
served as Vice President and Senior Litigation Counsel at the Center for Constitutional Litigation in Washington, 
DC, a law firm dedicated to preserving the right of access to courts and the right to trial by jury. Mr. Vail has 
practiced across the United States and in Europe. 
 1 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); Danya Shocair Reda, The 
Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085 (2012); 
Raymond H. Brescia & Edward J. Ohanian, The Politics of Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of Motion Practice 
in Civil Rights Litigation Under the New Plausibility Standard, 47 AKRON L. REV. 329 (2014); Alexander A. 
Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767 (2014); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, 
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014); Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in 
the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483 (2013) Robert S. Peck & John Vail, Blame It on the 
Bee Gees: The Attack on Trial Lawyers and Civil Justice, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323 (2007); David S. Schwartz, 
Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration 
Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Winter/Spring 2004); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big 
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 
(1997); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration As a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 
U.S.F. L. REV. 17 (2003). 
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and the power of juries—both of fundamental Constitutional importance2—have 
been diminished. 
The Woeful State of Court Funding 
I will begin with the obvious and will not belabor it: the courts have been 
starved of funding. National debates center on the federal courts, but the state 
courts handle about 95 percent of all cases and their financial condition are 
grim.3 
The federal courts have been caught in the political gridlock, the Senate 
notably refusing to take any action on a Supreme Court nominee but less 
noticeably dawdling in considering nominees to the lower courts. Resultantly, 
currently there are 103 judicial vacancies4 creating 38 “judicial emergencies,” 
situations in which access to justice is gravely impaired.5 
Nominally, lack of access affects everyone equally. But it ain’t so. Limiting 
access hurts people who seek to hold wrongdoers accountable and insulates 
wrongdoers from responsibility. Thus, in general, corporations—who are serial 
wrongdoers—benefit. But sometimes corporations want to sue other 
corporations. How have they dealt with that without losing insulation? One 
method: business courts. “There are today in the United States more trial courts 
that hear business disputes primarily or exclusively than at any previous moment 
in the nation’s history.”6 Just as racial segregationists created an alternative 
school system, liability segregationists created an alternative justice system. 
Even more creatively, though, they did it with state money. 
 
 2 Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (Right to jury trial is “a fundamental 
guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people.”); Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 
(2011) (Right to file civil suits is protected by First Amendment). 
 3 See, e.g., Andrew W. Yates, Using Inherent Judicial Power in A State-Level Budget Dispute, 62 Duke 
L.J. 1463 (2013) (footnotes omitted), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=3386&context=dlj (“From 2008 to 2011, legislatures in most states cut judiciary spending by 10 to 
15 percent. The result was a dramatic reduction in court services. Including Alabama, at least fourteen states 
have reduced the hours and days that their courts are open to the public. Litigants and defendants face lengthy 
delays before appearing on a court docket. Criminal cases in some states may take more than a year to clear, and 
civil cases fare much worse. State courts, which handle 95 percent of all litigation in the United States, are 
struggling to provide the critical adjudicatory services that make up an effective justice system. As the chief 
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it, state courts are at ‘the tipping point of dysfunction.’”). 
 4 Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS (last visited Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies. 
 5 Id. 
 6 John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2012). 
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The Diminished Power of Juries 
A trial before a jury was once an object of community focus and a source of 
entertainment. As county seats became larger, it lost that luster. But it remains 
an exercise in direct democracy, the one institution in America where, without 
intimidation, truth is spoken to power, and where power is judged by citizens. 
This political function of the jury famously was celebrated by Tocqueville.7 
Nebraska’s highest court, barring exclusion from juries on the basis of race, 
emphasized the leveling influence of citizens knowing that whosoever you may 
judge, by them you shall be judged.8 Judge William Young notes that the jury 
trial “is the New England town meeting writ large. It is as American as rock ‘n’ 
roll.”9 The jury trial continues to be acclaimed in rhetoric, but not in practice. 
Jury trials are disappearing,10 which is to the benefit of serial wrongdoers. 
The trend correlates with incremental changes in law that, cumulatively and 
quietly, have made access to juries more difficult. The Supreme Court 
effectively has re-written the Federal Arbitration Act, making it a tool for 
oppressing consumers, employees, and small businesses.11 Under the Supreme 
Court’s reading of the statute, if you agreed with an illegal bookmaking 
operation to arbitrate disputes about illegal payouts, an arbitrator, and not a court 
or a jury, must resolve the dispute.12 An arbitration agreement that bans small 
businesses, each with relatively small disputes, to band together to challenge 
fees charged by American Express, is enforceable, even if it bans with 100% 
certainty the small businesses from getting relief to which they clearly would 
have been entitled in court.13 The Act was written as a set of procedural rules 
for the federal courts, with the purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements 
between silk-stocking businesses.14 It was not meant to be outcome-
determinative, nor was it meant to deprive working people of their right to have 
serial wrongdoers answer to juries. 
 
 7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285–91 (rev. ed., The Colonial Press 1900). 
 8 Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, 223 (1873) (striking down preclusion of black citizens from jury service); 
see Matthew 7:2. 
 9 Honorable William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 67, 69 (2006), available at http://suffolklawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/Young_Article_ 
FINAL.pdf. 
 10 Id. at 73–75. 
 11 See Schwartz and Sternlight, supra note 1. 
 12 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 13 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 14 Schwartz, supra note 1.  
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More subtly, the Supreme Court has made procedural law less friendly to 
working people. Calling yourself an expert in procedure is a sure way to avoid 
invitations to social events. But Felix Frankfurter noted, “The history of 
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure,”15 and, 
more prosaically, John Dingell, a savvy legislator who served six decades in the 
House, would offer to let opponents write the substance of bills: “[Y]ou let me 
write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.”16 The Court’s moves have 
resulted in a profound shift of power away from citizen jurors and toward elite 
judges. 
The Supreme Court wrested power from juries when it blessed summary 
judgment in a set of cases known as The Trilogy.17 In practice, summary 
judgment motions cater to serial offenders who can outspend their opponents, 
typically represented by contingent-fee lawyers whose income is drained in long 
battles on paper that often could be more quickly and easily resolved by short 
trials before juries. The same problem of empowering the well-resourced 
occurred when the Court anointed federal trial judges as “gatekeepers” of expert 
testimony that juries might consider.18 The Court was concerned that juries 
would be unwarrantedly swayed by unacceptable scientific methodologies. It 
put the responsibility for determining methodological acceptability into the 
hands of elite judges despite the absence of evidence that judges are any better 
than a jury of twelve in sorting out such questions.19 In practice, motions to 
exclude experts generate piles of paper leading to hearings before judges who 
decide admissibility on the basis of the same evidence that a jury would hear to 
determine what weight the testimony should be accorded. It is an expensive mess 
that serves little purpose other than to insulate serial wrongdoers from being 
judged by jurors. 
The Court’s most serious departure from the democratization of justice 
worked by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and its 
 
 15 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 16 Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental 
Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell) 
(thanks to Professor Alan Morrison), available at http://www.levine-california-civil-procedure.com/quotes.asp. 
 17 See Miller, supra note 1. I speak here of actions in the federal courts, but state courts often fall in step 
with federal changes in procedure, and most have done so with regard to the matters I discuss here. 
 18 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Another unholy trinity. 
 19 Indeed, my analysis of jurors in one jurisdiction suggests strongly that jurors are better equipped than 
judges to decide these questions. Brief of amicus curiae Trial Lawyers Association of Metropolitan Washington, 
D.C. submitted in Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 2016 WL 6134870 (D.C. 2016) (on file with ECGAR). 
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vesting of judges with the power to dismiss cases when they did not find the 
story a plaintiff pleaded to be “plausible.” The subjectivity introduced through 
this threshold determination of whether a lawsuit lives or dies is unwarranted 
and dangerous, and it has resulted in disproportionate dismissal of civil rights 
complaints.20 In brief, the federal judiciary does not look much like America. It 
is more educated, which is good, but it is also more white and more male, and it 
disproportionately has been shaped by experience representing corporations and 
the government. Its experiences, which feed what it might find “plausible,” are 
very different from the experiences of America in general, and from the 
experiences of persons of color and members of other politically disfavored 
groups in particular. How many more people believe persons of color plausibly 
fear encounters with the police after having watched the video of Philando 
Castile being shot in Minneapolis? How many more people believe it is plausible 
that corporations bend the truth after they have seen the documentary, Hot 
Coffee? 
The jury remains out on the Court’s newest venture into procedural 
constraint—its December 2015 instruction to trial judges to assess the 
proportionality of discovery requests. The Court’s rulemakers candidly admit 
that discovery is not a problem in the run of cases in the federal courts.21 The 
problem addressed by this rule occurs primarily in huge cases between corporate 
leviathans.22 The Court’s rulemakers, not having the tools they need to persuade 
judges of the need to manage discovery in litigation between giant beasts, foisted 
a new paperwork task on everyone. An unprecedented response from the bar, 
staggering in volume, told the rulemakers: do not do this.23 They did it anyway, 
to the delight of serial offenders. The hopes of serial offenders are great; the 
fears of advocates for working Americans are greater; empiricists must tell us 
what has been wrought. 
 
 20 Reinert, supra note 1. 
 21 Briefing Book for June 3–4, 2013 Standing Committee meeting, at 65, available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/committee-rules-practice-and-procedure-june-2013 
(“In most cases discovery now, as it was then, is accomplished in reasonable proportion to the realistic needs of 
the case. This conclusion has been established by repeated empirical studies, including the large-scale closed-
case study done by the Federal Judicial Center for the Duke Conference.”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Judicial Conference of U.S., Report of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (May 2, 2014), in 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 29–30, 2014), at 331, available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda% 20Books/Standing/ST2014-05.pdf. 
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Restoring Power to the People 
The incoming administration and Congress profess to be on the side of 
working Americans. Here are three things they can do to make the civil justice 
system more fair: 
Feed the courts. On the federal and state levels, give the courts the resources 
they need to do their jobs. It is heinous that in some states courts have become 
inaccessible to persons needing domestic violence protective orders or 
enforcement of child support. Fill judicial vacancies. This proposal will be 
politically difficult, especially on the federal level. But, consensus can be 
reached by focusing on appointees to the trial bench who actually have tried 
cases and who believe in juries. The Seventh Amendment is not a partisan cause. 
Restore the original intent of the Federal Arbitration Act. Exclude 
employees, consumers, and small businesses from its judicially-expanded 
coverage. The mechanism to do so, the Arbitration Fairness Act, is ready.24 
Arbitration is a fine dispute resolution mechanism when agreed to after a dispute 
arises. Mindless enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses found in 
boilerplate agreements is a shameless abdication of the Constitutional “first 
duty” of government to provide a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes.25 
Restore the power of juries. Procedural law should be viewed through the 
lenses of the Seventh Amendment and the analogous respect for citizen 
decisionmakers shown in virtually all of the state constitutions. The first rule is 
that the People shall judge. 
Summary disposition is appropriate in some cases, but procedural rules 
should put a fat thumb on the scale in favor of resolution by jury trial. Any 
summary judgment motion that relies on a list of 250 assertedly uncontested 
facts is a candidate for trial, not summary disposition by a judge. Disputes 
about expert testimony should be regarded more as disputes about the weight 
which it is to be accorded rather than disputes regarding its admissibility. 
 
 24 See, e.g, Jean R. Sternlight, Counterpoint: Fixing The Mandatory Arbitration Problem: We Need The 
Arbitration Fairness Act Of 2009, 16 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 5, also available at http:// 
scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1880&context=facpub; Arbitration–Congress Considers Bill 
to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees. - Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 2262 (2008). 
 25 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first 
duties of government is to afford that protection.”). 
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A robust civil justice system, in which citizen decisionmakers play a primary 
role, is a hallmark of the American experiment. It has faded. A government that 
cares about working people will restore its luster. 
 
